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Introduction
Exceptional times can require exceptional policy measures. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, many central banks have implemented unprecedented standard and non-standard monetary policy measures, lowering key interest rates to approximately zero. To stimulate post-crisis economies characterized by low growth and low inflation, some central banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks of Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan, have even adopted negative policy rates. The rationale for negative rates is that they provide additional monetary stimulus, giving banks an incentive to lend to the real sector, and in this way support growth and a return to target inflation; see e.g. Coeuré (2014) .
At least two main concerns have been voiced by critics of negative policy rates; see e.g. Hannoun (2015) and Dombret (2017) . First, negative rates put pressure on the profitability of financial institutions (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2016) . As a result, banks might lend to riskier borrowers without being fully compensated for it ('risk shifting'). Indeed, Heider et al. (2017) find evidence for such effects in the euro area. Second, a 'search for yield' among institutional investors can lead to a disproportional demand for high-yielding risky assets; see Rajan (2013) . The implied asset price inflation can undermine financial stability (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) , and crowd out private investment (Acharya and Plantin, 2017 On the one hand, banks might benefit from the additional monetary stimulus implied by negative policy rates, e.g., via fewer non-performing loans, or via increases in asset prices. On the other hand, banks can also suffer from negative rates via squeezed net interest rate margins for new business. Which types of banks benefit and which suffer is as yet unclear. In addition, it is currently unknown whether cuts to negative rates are 'special,' for example because they imply a different financial stability response than comparable cuts to non-negative rates. In this paper we contribute to answering these questions. To do so, we study the risk impact of three successive deposit facility rate (DFR) cuts by the ECB to negative values, each by 10 basis points (bps). Specifically, we study the rate cuts on June 5, 2014 , September 4, 2014 , and December 3, 2015 . Furthermore, we examine whether the impact of these cuts is qualitatively different from a 10 bps cut of the DFR to zero on July 5, 2012.
We measure a bank's risk using 'SRisk'. SRisk is a measure for a bank's propensity to become undercapitalized in a crisis; see Brownlees and Engle (2017) . We interpret SRisk as a bank-specific risk measure that captures forward-looking market perceptions. 1 Using difference-in-differences regressions we find that after a cut to an increasingly negative interest rate, the majority of banks are perceived as more risky, i.e., more prone to become undercapitalized in a crisis. This is not the case for all banks, however. The risk impact depends on banks' business models. Large banks with sufficiently diversified income streams are perceived to be less (systemically) risky. Such banks appear to benefit in net terms from negative rates. By contrast, smaller banks that follow a more traditional business model and rely predominantly on deposit funding, are perceived as more risky. The documented heterogeneity supports the key result of Heider et al. (2017) that bank characteristics become an important determinant of bank behavior and monetary policy transmission at negative rates. Finally, we find that a 'placebo' DFR cut from +10 bps to zero in July 2012 triggers different SRisk responses than the equally-sized cuts below zero. This suggests that cuts to negative rates have a different financial stability impact than more conventional cuts to non-negative rates.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical methodology, including the data. Section 3 summarizes the empirical findings.
Data and empirical methodology

Business model classification
Based on balance sheet variables from SNL Financial, N = 111 banks located in the euro area are allocated to six business model groups. The balance sheet variables as well as business model groups coincide with the ones identified and described in detail in Lucas et al. (2016) . Our classification sample ranges from 2012Q2 to 2014Q2. As a result, the business model classification is less influenced by the severe euro area sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2011, and predetermined with respect to the DFR cuts in 2014 and 2015. Banks that underwent distressed mergers, were acquired, or ceased to operate for other reasons between 2012 and 2014, are excluded from the analysis.
We proceed in two steps. First, we allocate 'clear-cut' cases based on threshold rules. These rules are described below. 'Clear-cut' cases identify the cluster labels. Second, we use the finite mixture model introduced in Lucas et al. (2016) to allocate the remaining banks. Allocating clear-cut cases in a first step helps us to interpret the clustering outcomes.
We distinguish six business model groups:
(A) Large universal banks, including G-SIBs (15.3% of banks). Banks with total assets of more than e800 bn [large], and a share of net interest income of less than 70% of operating revenue [universal] , are allocated to this group with probability one.
(B) Corporate/wholesale-focused banks (19.8%). Banks with total assets of at least e50 bn, and a share of retail loans to total loans of less than 20% [corporate-focused], are in this group with probability one.
(C) Fee-focused banks/asset managers (16.2%). Banks with a share of net fee & commission income to operating revenue of at least 50% [fee-focused] are in this group with probability one.
(D) Small diversified lenders (28.8%). Banks with total assets of less than e50 bn [small], a share or retail loans to total loans between 40-60% [diversified across borrowers], and a loan to assets ratio of at least 60% [predominantly a lender] are in this group with probability one.
(E) Domestic retail lenders (11.7%). Banks with a share of domestic loans to total loans of at least 90% [domestic] and a share of retail loans to total loans of at least 70% [retail] are in this group with probability one.
(F) Mutual/co-operative-type banks (8.1%). Banks with total assets of less than e100 bn, a loans to assets ratio of at least 70%, and a deposits to total assets ratio of at least 50% are in this group with probability one. Banks in this cluster turn out to often be organized as a local savings bank or co-operative bank; thus the label.
SRisk for listed and non-listed banks
SRisk is the estimated capital shortfall of a bank, conditional on a 40% drop in a world equity index over a six months-ahead horizon; see Brownlees and Engle (2017) . The measure is modelled as a function of a bank's equity market valuation, leverage ratio, the volatility of its stock price, and the correlation of its stock price with the world index. Estimates are publicly available for euro area financial firms at a monthly frequency on https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu.
We observe SRisk for 44 listed euro area banks, together with quarterly balance sheet data from the SNL Financial database. For 67 non-listed euro area banks, however, we observe only the accounting data. To ensure a representative sample, and thus to include all banks in our analysis, we apply a matching procedure to infer SRisk for non-listed banks. Specifically, we match non-listed banks to the 'nearest neighboring' banks for which market data are available.
The details of the matching procedure are as follows. For any unlisted bank i with average accounting dataȳ i· , we compute the J i nearest listed neighbors based on the Mahalanobis distance,D(ȳ i· ,ȳ j· ) 2 = (ȳ i· −ȳ j· ) Ω −1 (ȳ i· −ȳ j· ) for i = j = 1, . . . , J i . To safeguard interpretability, we require that all listed nearest neighbors come from the same business model group as bank i. The Mahalanobis distance scales the data by their unconditional covariance matrixΩ
The nearest neighbors are ordered from close to far, i.e.,D(ȳ i· ,ȳ j· ) ≤D(ȳ i· ,ȳ j+1,· ). Using the J i nearest listed neighbors for an unlisted bank i, we impute bank i's SRisk by SRisk it = Ji j=1 SRisk jt · w j , where the kernel weights are given by w j = j −1 / Ji j=1 j −1 . Note that banks that are closer in term of Mahalanobis distance receive a larger weight.
Difference-in-Differences regressions
We study group means based on a difference-in-differences regression on dummy variables,
where P t is a dummy variable equal to zero before an ECB DFR cut and equal to one thereafter, BM ik is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i belongs to business model group k and zero otherwise, α, β, γ k , and δ k , k = 1, . . . , K − 1 are unknown coefficients, and it is a zero mean error term that is uncorrelated with the regressors. For inference, we cluster error terms at the bank level.
The regression equation (1) allows us to benchmark the time differences to a reference group. We select the fee-focused banks (C) as our reference group. A high share of net fees & commissions income implies that these banks should be less affected by squeezed net interest margins for new business. Instead, fee-focused banks could be exposed to the beneficial aspects of negative rates.
We identify the impact of the rate cuts based on a narrow window. For example, for the cut on June 05, 2014, regression (1) implicitly compares the end-of-May 2014 with the end-of-June 2014 (T=2) cross-sections of SRisk. Differences across business models are also apparent for the smaller banks in D to F. The evolution of SRisk is quite similar for these banks until mid-2012. Post-2012, however, banks in D are perceived as less prone to being undercapitalized in a crisis compared to banks in groups E and F. In 2014 and 2015, average SRisk in group D even turns negative. Banks in D are more diversified across borrowers (less retail) and across borders (less domestic). As a result, they appear to be less 'stuck,' and better able to adjust to negative rates. Large universal banks (A) and fee-focused banks (C, the reference group) appear to have benefited rather than suffered from the cuts to negative values in terms of reductions in SRisk. By contrast, relatively smaller banks that follow more traditional business models do not decrease their SRisk around the rate cuts, i.e., increase their SRisk relative to the decreasing level of the reference group (C). The interaction terms are significant on the first two cut dates for group F, and on the second cut date for group E. Domestic retail lenders and mutual/co-operative-type banks do not appear to benefit in net terms from negative central bank deposit rates.
Main findings
Second, rate cuts to negative values lead to different SRisk responses than the July 2012 cut; see the right column in Table 1 . For example, SRisk for smaller deposit-taking banks in groups E and F decreases in 2012 relative to reference group C, and in absolute terms shows an (insignificant) increase, contrary to what is observed for the later cuts. Large universal banks (A) are perceived as more risky around the July 2012 cut, possibly reflecting less dramatic valuation gains from increasing asset prices. Again, the 2012 impact is different from what is observed for the later cuts. We conclude that cuts to negative rates appear to be different ('special') in terms of their financial stability impact.
